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Race, Sex, and the Division of Labor: A Comment on 
Joan Williams’s Reshaping the Work-Family Debate 
Richard Delgado† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Often, knowing the origin of a rule or practice is helpful in under-
standing its current operation and what one must do if one wishes to 
change it. Consider, for example, the sexual division of labor that is the 
main subject of Professor Williams’s book.1 Professor Williams de-
scribes in chilling detail how workplace practices, some of them having 
the force of law, disadvantage women, particularly those with children or 
elderly relatives.2 Whether caregivers or not, women perform work be-
low their ability level, encounter obstacles that do not afflict men, and 
perform a disproportionate share of housework and caregiving.3 Even 
professional-class women experience glass ceilings and inadequate ac-
commodations for motherhood.4 
Where did these practices come from, and why are they so en-
trenched in the United States? European workers enjoy a shorter work-
week, longer vacations, and more favorable family leave policies than 
their American counterparts.5 Healthcare and disability policies are more 
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 1. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 1 (2010). “[T]his book is about reframing debates about work and family.” Id. at 1. “Be-
cause masculine norms are a prime mover of the social power dynamics within which both men and 
women negotiate their daily lives, feminists need to attend to masculinity.” Id. at 2. “That gender 
system, inherited from the nineteenth century, divides daily life neatly into the mutually exclusive 
realms of public life and domestic life [and] imputes specific, and different, biological and psycho-
logical characteristics to men and women. Women are deemed too good for the nasty and brutish 
world of commerce . . . .” Id. at 4. 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 42–76 (Chapter 2, “One Sick Child Away from Being Fired”); id. at 77–109 
(Chapter 3, “Masculine Norms at Work”). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 42–76 (describing workplace practices that place heavy responsibilities on 
caretakers); id. at 89–92 (describing bullying and machismo at work); id. at 93–99 (analyzing double 
binds and inequitable standards that burden women workers). 
 4. See id. at 155 (defining the term “professional-managerial class”); id. at 164–66 (describing 
fear of falling); id. at 166–75 (describing stressful lives and trying to do it all). 
 5. See id. at 2, 6–8, 33, 35–40, 126; see also Katrin Bennhold, Flexible Workweek Alters the 
Rhythm of Dutch Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010, at A13. 
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generous there as well, and European husbands perform a higher percen-
tage of the housework and child care than do similarly situated men in 
the United States.6 
What accounts for these role differentiations, and why are they so 
resistant to change? Professor Williams, who, to her credit, aims to 
reform them, devotes relatively little attention to their origins, saying 
only that they seem bound up with capitalism and appeared with the ad-
vent of the factory system.7 
II. RACE AND SEX 
And what of that other source of social stratification, race? In our 
society, for example, Mexican Americans pick fruit and tend crops.8 
Blacks work in the service sector.9 Asians tend computers.10 And so on 
for each of the different groups. While this is not true of every member 
of those groups, America’s workplaces are as sharply stratified by race as 
they are by sex. 
Professor Williams explains that she will not be concerned about 
race in the division of labor;11 it is a large problem that requires separate 
treatment of its own.12 It is indeed a large problem; however, one cannot 
                                                 
 6. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 32, 35–38. 
 7. See id. at 4 (“[t]hat gender system, inherited from the nineteenth century. . . .”); id. at 6–7 
(attributing unfair sex roles and stereotypes to the country’s devotion to small government and “capi-
talism gone amok”); id. at 8 (“Any inquiry into work-family conflict in the United States needs to 
investigate why we lack the kinds of family supports that exist elsewhere. The answer is that the 
dominance of the business elite has made unthinkable the kinds of supports that Europeans have 
nurtured.”); id. at 77 (“[S]eparate spheres arose in the late eighteenth century.”); id. at 89 
(“[M]asculinity first became associated with breadwinner status in the nineteenth century.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Portent: California and the Coming Neocolonial 
Order, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1293 app. at 1339–44 (2010) [hereinafter Delgado, Portent] (illustrat-
ing racial composition of various sectors of California’s workforce); see also RICHARD DELGADO, 
JUAN PEREA & JEAN STEFANCIC, LATINOS AND THE LAW 634–96 (2008) (Part Seven: “The 
Workplace (Including the Fields)”). 
 9. Delgado, Portent, supra note 8, app. at 1339–40. 
 10. Id. 
 11. E.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 9 (“Without a doubt, listening to workers of color is 
equally important. Yet political scientists tell us that white workers are the swing demographic of 
‘Reagan Democrats’ who have shifted Republican since 1970. For that reason, blacks are not the 
focus of this discussion. . . . A study of the ways white and black workers are alike and differ is 
important and fascinating—but not our topic here.”). For further discussion of Professor Williams’s 
treatment of race and class, see Robert S. Chang, Joan Williams, Coalitions, and Getting Beyond the 
Wages of Whiteness and the Wages of Maleness, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 825, 826–28 (2011); and 
Jean Stefancic, Talk the Talk, but Walk the Walk: A Comment on Joan Williams’s Reshaping the 
Work-Family Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 815, 822–23 (2011). 
 12. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that race falls outside her range of consideration). 
She does, however, urge separate, “anti-essentialist” consideration of the special problems of women 
workers of color, without developing this point in much detail. See, e.g., id. at 144–48. 
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adequately account for the role of sex in the workplace without also con-
sidering that of race. 
A. Early Social Roles 
Men and women performed different roles beginning in early histo-
ry. In hunter–gatherer societies, men were the hunters, while women 
skinned the animals, foraged, and prepared the food.13 The Bible men-
tions specialized roles for men and women,14 a practice that continued 
largely unchanged through the Middle Ages and Reformation.15 
But role differentiations became even more deeply entrenched dur-
ing the period of European colonialism.16 Any account of present-day 
workplace stratification needs to proceed aware of this colonial period 
and how it created and reinforced social roles. 
During the colonial period, most of the settling force consisted, at 
first, of men.17 Conditions were arduous, and the natives required domi-
nation, then ruling.18 Diseases, tropical heat, and wild animals posed 
constant dangers.19 Accordingly, during the early stages of conquest and 
settlement, the colonial forces consisted almost entirely of men. 
The women stayed behind, tending the home fires in London or 
Marseilles and waiting for the men to return or notify them that it was 
safe to join them in the newly conquered regions.20 Until then, the wom-
en would remain chaste and virtuous. With ladylike, easily controlled 
libidos, they were expected to keep their minds on the finer things of life 
while waiting for the signal to join the men. In fact, many of the women 
did not remain true to their wayfaring boyfriends, but sought new roman-
tic outlets of their own.21 
For their part, the men spent their days putting down rebellious na-
tives and imposing a new administrative order. At night, the men would 
                                                 
 13. See, e.g., Hunter-Gatherer, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 3, 2008, 9:29 PM), 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Hunter-gatherer (describing hunter–gatherer societies). 
 14. E.g., Proverbs 31:10–31 (describing woman’s role in relation to her husband). 
 15. See generally SHULAMITH SHAHAR, THE FOURTH ESTATE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES (1983) (describing women’s lives during this period). 
 16. By colonialism I mean the period from the late fifteenth to the twentieth century, when 
English, French, Belgian, Spanish, and Portuguese forces were colonizing and ruling much of Asia, 
Africa, and the New World. See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Homily: Storytelling, Elite Self-Interest, and Legal 
Change, 87 OR. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (2008) [hereinafter Delgado, Homily]. See generally HAUNTED 
BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY (Ann Stoler ed., 2006); 
ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT’S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS (1995) (describing sexuality during this period). 
 18. Delgado, Homily, supra note 17, at 1288. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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enjoy the company of native concubines.22 The medical science of the 
time held that male sexual abstinence could lead to insanity.23 Thus, the 
men were under a kind of duty to find sexual outlets, which they did in 
the form of native concubines. During the day, these women worked as 
servants in the colonial master’s household, doing his cleaning, cooking, 
and sewing. At night they slept in his bed.24 The native woman emerged 
then, in the literature of the day, as a willing sexual servant, an empty 
vessel waiting to be filled, potentially impure and a source of disease.25 
What of native men? These brown, black, or Asian men were the 
feared competitors. Seeing their women lying down with the colonial 
overlords could easily infuriate them, provoking a violent response.26 
The dark man, then, represented disorder, threat, and rebellion. 
Colonialism thus gave rise to a two-by-two matrix in which race 
and sex both played a part. It provided separate, distinct roles for white 
men, white women, black men, and black women. These roles lasted, 
with some minor alterations, into the industrial era when Professor Wil-
liams believes they began.27 But, as we have seen, they were in full force 
well before that. Moreover, the sexual roles on which she focuses grew 
together with roles that were expressly racial. 
B. Social Roles in Early America 
In the United States, sex and race roles followed a similar path. The 
Pocahontas myth, for example, depicted Indian women as awaiting the 
virile arrival of the white colonials,28 while later, in the Southwest, Mex-
ican women played similar roles during the period surrounding Anglo 
conquest and occupation of the region.29 
In the South, these roles received new reinforcement when planta-
tion society developed fine houses, with the slaves working the field and 
                                                 
 22. See DURBA GHOSH, SEX AND THE FAMILY IN COLONIAL INDIA: THE MAKING OF EMPIRE 
69–205 (2006). See generally Hanneke Ming, Barracks–Concubinage in the Indies, 1887–1920, 35 
INDONESIA 65 (1983). 
 23. See 6 HAVELOCK ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 178–216 (1911) (Chapter 6, 
“The Problem of Sexual Abstinence”). For a discussion of how modern scientific claims of essential 
difference between boys’ and girls’ brains influence education policy, see Katharine B. Silbaugh, 
Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733, 743–45 (2011). 
 24. GHOSH, supra note 22, at 208–11. See generally Ming, supra note 22. 
 25. See generally PHILIPPA LEVINE, PROSTITUTION, RACE, AND POLITICS: POLICING 
VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE (2003). 
 26. Id. at 311–13. See generally JOCK MCCULLOCH, BLACK PERIL, WHITE VIRTUE: SEXUAL 
CRIME IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1902–1935 (2000). 
 27. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A DIVERSE 
AMERICA 934–37, 1039, 1074–76 (2d ed. 2007) (describing Pocahontas in reality and in myth). 
 29. Id. at 304 (noting that Anglo settlers would often take Mexican or Latina wives out of 
convenience or to gain access to one half of their community property under local law). 
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sleeping in rude shacks at a distance from the grand homes of the owner 
and his family.30 The master’s female children led lives of privilege, with 
piano lessons, instruction in French or Italian, and foreign travel. They 
learned to make polite conversation in anticipation of the well-born 
young men who would one day seek their hands in marriage.31 
Yet their lives were sharply circumscribed. Young girls of planta-
tion society could not climb trees or go for long rambles, especially ones 
that might take them near where the slaves worked and lived.32 That 
might expose them to the sight of shirtless men, with muscles bulging. 
They might hear crude language or see men sweating or urinating. They 
could not gallop a horse in those areas, much less go for a swim in the 
nearby river. They could not see, close up, how the cycle of planting and 
harvesting occurred, could not begin to learn agriculture or the econom-
ics of farming. With their options thus limited, women could explore on-
ly a few pursuits—literature, music, teaching, or parlor conversation.33 
White women, then, lived constrained lives precisely because dark 
men led ones of brutal enslavement. Southern aristocracy created the im-
age of the delicate, refined woman, dressed in finery, and spending her 
days in a world of manners, music, and refinement. And the reason that it 
did so was that it was necessary to protect young women from the sights 
and sounds of slavery, especially the male kind. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF 
HISTORIC PATTERNS 
What does it matter if an account, like Joan Williams’s, neglects to 
trace contemporary workplace practices to their origins? First, a reader 
can easily fail to understand how deeply entrenched these practices are, 
as well as how they interact in producing the division of labor we see in 
today’s workplace. Second, one can focus one’s remedial efforts on the 
wrong thing. One can, for example, believe that the problem will yield to 
increasing efforts to educate women on their oppressed status.34 One can 
look to see where the opposition to fairer workplace rules is strongest, 
                                                 
 30. See Richard Delgado, Linking Arms: Recent Books on Interracial Coalition as an Avenue 
of Social Reform, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 878 (2003). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 3 (“The basic picture is one of women discovering that 
they ‘really are’ different from men, that women’s priorities are different, and that the lure of child-
ren pulls them away from work and into the home sweet home—or really car sweet car, as they drive 
their children from one enrichment activity to the next. This ‘opt out’ storyline is inaccurate in many 
ways.”). 
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namely among working class men, and designate this class the principal 
target for persuasion and reform efforts.35 
A. The Problem of Social Class 
Professor Williams’s otherwise admirable book exhibits both short-
comings. For example, she devotes two substantial chapters to social 
class, in an effort to unearth reasons why blue-collar people do not sup-
port female equity in the workplace as strongly as her own professional-
class friends do.36 A major objective of her book is to solve this mystery 
and find ways upper-class liberals can make inroads with working-class 
people.37 At times, she expresses this objective in terms of the predica-
ment of the Obama Administration, which has not generated much sup-
port among the working class either.38 And she finds the reason for both 
failures in the inability of upper-class professionals to communicate with 
working-class people without insulting them.39 The upper class talk 
down to working-class people and use fancy language.40 They offer them 
the wrong kind of alcoholic beverage at get-out-the-vote parties.41 They 
expect them to resonate with high-flown language about equity and uni-
versal rights. 
                                                 
 35. See id. at 6 (noting that “reducing work-family conflict also requires changing the way we 
think about class. . . . At an electoral level, the kinds of family supports available in Europe are 
unthinkable in the United States, in part because of an American politics fueled by class conflicts 
between the professional-managerial class and the white working class.”); id. at 9–10 (noting that 
her focus will be “on the white working class,” which typically votes Republican, exhibits a class-
based masculine attitude, and feels misunderstood and scorned by elite groups of wine-sipping pro-
fessionals). 
 36. Id. at 151–86 (Chapter 5, “The Class Culture Gap”); id. at 187–214 (Chapter 6, “Culture 
Wars as Class Conflict”). 
 37. E.g., id. at 9–10 (noting that progressives have exhibited disrespect for working-class 
whites and that this “is part of a gaping cultural gap between the white working class and the profes-
sional-managerial class from which the reform-minded elite typically is drawn”); id. at 151–52, 211; 
see also Laura T. Kessler, Feminism for Everyone, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 679, 692 (2011) (noting 
that Williams advocates pragmatism and compromise—“feminism in drag”—to persuade working-
class men and women to sign on to her program of workplace reform and that she assigns much of 
their failure, to date, to cultural misunderstandings and failure to communicate). 
 38. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 10–11 (“But even Barack Obama, with his remarka-
ble leadership skills, will be able to accomplish comparatively little unless he can build a coalition to 
support a progressive agenda. . . . Progressives can help by reshaping their relationship to the white 
working class.”); id. at 151–52, 187 (noting Obama’s off-putting gaffe over the vegetable arugula); 
id. at 190–93, 206–07 (same, over guns and hunting). 
 39. Id. at 206–07 (describing Obama’s problems); id. at 151–54, 194, 203–13 (describing cul-
ture wars and use of symbols that alienate the working class); id. at 213 (highlighting the need to 
stop “insulting white workers”). 
 40. See id. at 151–54, 194, 203–13. 
 41. See id. at 171–75, 186–201 (noting the variety of affronts, some unintentional, that profes-
sional-class people commit when trying to recruit among the working class). 
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My suspicion is that the reasons why working-class people have not 
jumped on either Obama’s or Professor Williams’s bandwagon have lit-
tle to do with style points. Rather, working-class people have interests 
that are genuinely adverse to those of upper-class people.42 In short, it is 
not a big misunderstanding or a failure to communicate. Working-class 
whites (I speak of whites only because Professor Williams has excluded 
race from consideration) are mainly interested in job creation.43 Upper-
class whites, by contrast, want better quality of life on the job.44 Work-
ing-class whites want stronger unions.45 Many upper-class whites are 
indifferent to unionism and the union movement.46 Working-class whites 
want lower taxes.47 Upper-class whites can afford higher taxes and, in 
many cases, favor them because they will allow society to be more egali-
tarian, which pleases the upper-class person and eases her social con-
science.48 Working-class whites are interested in security.49 Their upper-
class brethren are peaceniks who dislike the police and wish they were 
                                                 
 42. The classic work on this point remains KARL MARX, CAPITAL (1867). But is class a dated 
concept, limited, perhaps, to its nineteenth-century origins in early socialist thought? Not at all. See, 
e.g., A.O. Scott, Hollywood’s Class Warfare: Films are Starting to Reflect the Economy’s Impact on 
Some Battered Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at AR1 (noting how popular movies are 
increasingly focusing on class conflict and struggle). But see Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the 
Class Culture Wars, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2011) (noting that rural–urban differences account 
for much of the class divide). 
 43. Consider, for example, practically any headline or news story describing the Tea Party 
movement and its agenda (We Need Jobs!); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 59 (noting the 
importance to working-class men of being the breadwinner in the family). 
 44. See generally NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDNER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A 
GOOD LIFE IN THE LAW (2010). 
 45. On the union movement, see, e.g., NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND 
SOCIALIST (WORKING CLASS IN AMERICAN HISTORY) (1984); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 
7, 43–47, 49, 60–63, 71 (noting the role of unions in the lives of some working-class people). 
 46. See, e.g., Stanley Aronowitz, Should Academic Unions Get Involved in University Gover-
nance?, LIBERAL EDUC., Fall 2006, at 22, available at http://www.aacu.org/liberaleducation/le-
fa06/le-fa06_feature3.cfm. 
 47. See supra text accompanying note 43 (No More Taxes!); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, 
at 40. 
 48. See, e.g., Joshua Miller, Warren Buffet: Read My Lips, Raise My Taxes, ABCNEWS.COM: 
THIS WEEK WITH CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR (Nov. 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/warre
n-buffett-read-lips-raise-taxes/story?id=12199889. 
 49. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 43 (No More Liberal Judges! Throw the Book at 
Criminals!); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 180–81; id. at 4, 83–85 (describing working-class 
men’s concern over appearing manly). 
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fewer in number and less visible.50 They also dislike military spending 
and foreign wars.51 
These generalizations all have exceptions, of course, but my point 
is that the working and the upper classes are diverse classes. In fact, that 
is, practically, why we consider them separate classes: They have differ-
ent interests. Otherwise, we would designate them a single class with a 
broad income range.52 
B. Le Différend 
Social scientist Jean-Francois Lyotard described the effort to paper 
over differences such as those with which we have been concerned as 
giving rise to le différend.53 Le différend is a condition, similar to Emile 
Durkeim’s anomie54 that arises when a group does not see itself in the 
coercive language of another, superior group.55 It cannot address its 
complaints in the language of redress that the other group will recog-
nize.56 Professor Williams, in laying the blame for Obama’s unpopularity 
on the working class, creates, unwittingly perhaps, exactly such a situa-
tion. She urges that working-class people see the world through the prism 
                                                 
 50. Consider, for example, the Anglo-American peace movement, with its heavy preponder-
ance of college students and professors; intellectuals such as Henry Thoreau, Norman Cousins, and 
Bertrand Russell; political leaders such as Eugene McCarthy; and high-toned religions such as the 
Quakers and Unitarians; see also Naomi Klein, The War on Dissent, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Nov. 
25, 2003, at A21, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views03/1125-08.htm. 
 51. Id. 
 52. If it is not plain how groups can have conflicting interests that are not reducible to mere 
problems in communication, consider two further examples. A smooth-talking shop foreman ad-
dresses a meeting of workers discontent with low salaries and poor working conditions in a factory. 
“We’re all on the same side,” he says. “Management, like you, wants a happy and productive 
workplace. Let’s all work together toward that end.” Of course, that is, at best, a partial truth. Man-
agement usually wants as much of the profits from the workers’ labor and as little trouble as possi-
ble. The workers, for their part, want as much of the fruits of their labor as possible, ideally one-
hundred percent. Or, imagine the faculty of a university that is discontent and pondering forming a 
union. Their employer has been hiring too many part-time adjuncts, impairing the quality of instruc-
tion, and eliminating departments, such as philosophy, that lack any immediate payoff. The adminis-
tration responds that a union is unwise and unseemly: “We are all professionals here, and profes-
sionals don’t unionize. Let us, instead, work together.” The point in each case is that the parties have 
different interests that are not easily papered over. This point is echoed in other contributions to this 
Colloquy. See, e.g., Gowri Ramachandran, Confronting Difference and Finding Common Ground, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2011) (“I’m skeptical that we really share enough common ground 
to create policies all these groups can get behind.”). 
 53. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE (Georges van Den 
Abbeele trans., 1988) (1983). 
 54. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY (1892) (discussing the alie-
nation of the working class). 
 55. See LYOTARD, supra note 53; George Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use 
of Narrative in the Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 684 (2003) (making a similar point). 
 56. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 55. 
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of a white-wine-sipping suburban liberal—a tough sell. And she wonders 
why the same group does not enthusiastically back workplace reforms 
that will inure mainly to the benefit of university-educated women seek-
ing to have it all. 
Women of all classes do need more and better social benefits, in-
cluding workplace relief when they are pregnant or engaged in child-care 
activities at home. And the United States does need a president who will 
forthrightly back universal, single-payer healthcare, the end of senseless 
wars, a reduction of the military budget, and better schools. We will not 
get them, however, by targeting the working class for their failure to em-
brace a feminist program of workplace reforms or the Obama Adminis-
tration for its failure to communicate in terms that will move working-
class people. That requires changes on both sides. Otherwise conversa-
tion fails, and we find ourselves ensnared in le différend. 
IV. WHY REFORM MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF BOTH RACE AND SEX 
Moreover, if sexual oppression and the racial variety are historical-
ly linked,57 reformers need to proceed aware of that connection. For ex-
ample, blue-collar men do not like men of color forming close, especially 
romantic, relationships with white women, while upper-class people are 
delighted (or say they are) when this happens among members of their 
class.58 Working-class people, as Professor Williams notes, are often not 
particularly proud of their work and find meaning in family, church, and 
recreational activities, such as bowling.59 Professional-class people iden-
tify strongly with their work,60 are atheists or agnostics, and engage in 
recreational activities that are educational in nature, such as going to 
concerts or travelling in foreign countries.61 But as we have seen, some 
of these patterns are historically rooted and make sense culturally and 
historically for the groups who practice them. 
Much about American society is deeply in need of reform; our cul-
ture is littered with unfair practices that burden men, women, and mem-
                                                 
 57. See supra notes 17–33 and accompanying text. 
 58. On attitudes toward interracial intimacy, see, e.g., RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL 
INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (1981); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 
152, 196–98 (noting how racial attitudes explain some of the alienation of white working-class vot-
ers from the Democratic Party). On how masculinities theory helps explain some of the behaviors of 
men, particularly working-class men, toward women workers, wives, mothers, housework, and simi-
lar matters, see Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703 
(2011). 
 59. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 186 (describing a worker who exploded when asked about 
his job; it turned out he made toilets). 
 60. Id. at 32–33, 159. 
 61. Id. at 175. 
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bers of practically every race.62 But we will not change these practices 
until we know where they come from and why different groups find them 
normal or tolerable. The major point I would like to convey to Professor 
Williams and her readers is that all of us will have to learn to talk and 
write about social change without placing the entire onus on those who 
lead lives and have interests different from ours. 
                                                 
 62. See, e.g., JUAN PEREA ET AL., supra note 28 (detailing many such examples). On the role of 
media stories such as the opt-out mother cheerfully returning to the hearth, see Nancy Levit, Reshap-
ing the Narrative Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 751, 761–64 (2011); see also Beth A. Burkstrand-
Reid, “Trophy Husbands” and “Opt-Out” Moms, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 666–69 (2011) (dis-
cussing how stories of male trophy husbands likewise grease the skids toward corporate domination 
of the workforce). 
